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All usWhy do firms pay different wages? Empirical evidence suggests the pres-
ence of substantial differences in firm pay controlling for worker skill.
Moreover, these differences are uncorrelated with skills, indicating the
absence of sorting. I show that the face value interpretation is inconsis-
tent with evidence on coworker segregation. I interpret the evidence
by applying a sorting model and show that the correlation is biased. I
identify nonmonotonicities in wages as the reason for this bias and show
that a measure of worker-coworker sorting is more accurate. By calibrat-
ing the model to US data, I confirm that the model matches many job
market characteristics.I. IntroductionIt is well documented that a substantial share of wage dispersion takes place
between firms. For example, Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) performed a
variance decomposition of USmanufacturing wages and found that aroundearlier version of this paper was part ofmy dissertation and had the title “Sorting in the
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All60 percent of dispersion occurs between rather than within firms. Similarly,
the documented large firm-size wage differentials (e.g., Oi and Idson 1999)
andfirm industry differentials (e.g., Krueger and Summers 1988) have been
the focus of a number of studies. These differentials could be attributed to
differences in worker skill levels across firms as well as discrepancies in wage
policies between firms. The latter could arise because of noncompetitive
features of a labormarket. Abowd, Kramarz, andMargolis (1999), Abowd,
Creecy, and Kramarz (2002), and Abowd et al. (2004) (hereafter AKM) at-
tempted to quantify the relative importance of worker versus firm compo-
nents in determining wages. The authors focused on estimating a wage re-
gression that includes bothworker andfirmfixedeffects, whichwas achieved
through the use of longitudinal matched employer-employee data sets.
Theirmethodologywas subsequently applied to thedata sets of several dif-
ferent countries with consistent results. Authors of extant works based on
this approach reported substantial firm fixed-effects differentials, which
account for a sizable share of firm-size differentials and industry wage dif-
ferentials. Another robust result arising from this methodology is that the
correlation between the two sets of fixed effects is close to zero, or some-
times even negative. Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) recently quantified
how changes in the dispersion of worker and firm fixed effects, and their
correlation (referred to as sorting), explain changes in inequality over
time.
This work aims to provide structural interpretation of the facts obtained
by applying the AKMmethodology, using explicit models of labor market
dynamics. I examine models that include both worker and firm heteroge-
neity, as well as a job-matching process that yields mobility and assortative
matching. My first aim is to make explicit the connection between the
AKM model and the widely used equilibrium job search model, which I
label “the piece-ratemodel.”Themodel features a dynamicmatching pro-
cess betweenheterogeneous workers and firms in a frictional environment
and has been shown to successfully explain several characteristics pertain-
ing to labor market transitions and wage dynamics. According to its pos-
tulates, the frictions in the economy cause more productive firms to pay
higher wages to identical workers, resulting in a self-selection process of
workers into firms. However, this process is independent of worker skill
level, which implies the absence of sorting in equilibrium. As a result, this
model provides a “face value” interpretation for the facts.More specifically,
the worker fixed effects capture differences in skill levels across individual
employees, whereas the firm fixed effects capture wage differentials paid
by more productive companies as a result of frictions. Under this interpre-
tation, the high dispersion of firm fixed effects found in the data is indic-
ative of a sizable degree of frictional wage dispersion. Moreover, the fact
that the correlation between fixed effects is close to zero is supportive of
an equilibrium with no sorting between worker and firm types.This content downloaded from 129.215.019.038 on January 24, 2018 01:11:36 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
ﬁrm wage differentials 000This paper’s first contribution stems from demonstrating that the piece-
rate model is inconsistent with new evidence, which I sourced from a
Brazilian matched employer-employee data set. Applying the AKMmeth-
odology, I obtain results largely similar to those reported in the extant lit-
erature with respect to the facts already described. In addition, I also pro-
vide evidence of a high correlation between the fixed effects of workers
and their coworkers, which suggests a strongdegree of worker segregation
among firms.1 This violates the model’s implication that the distribution
of workers is the same across firms. Furthermore, I use data on education,
occupation, sectors, and locations to demonstrate that this correlation is
not driven by composition of observables, a possibility that has been al-
lowed for in empirical applications of the model.
After presenting the evidence of coworker sorting, I shift the focus to-
ward a variant of the job search model that actually features assortative
matching in equilibrium. A clear challenge stems from the need for the
model to account for the zero correlation between fixed effects while per-
mitting sorting in equilibrium. Thus, I build on the frictional matching
model with assortative matching proposed by Shimer and Smith (2000).
The main feature of the model is the addition of on-the-job search (both
voluntary and involuntary), which is a pervasive feature of labor markets
and is shown to substantially affect the extent of frictional wage dispersion
in the model (e.g., Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante 2011).
The proposed model incorporates an equilibrium wage function that
does not conform to the AKM specification. In AKM, firms give an extra
bonus to all their employees (the fixed effect), whereas this model yields
wages that are nonmonotone with respect to firmproductivity. In the sort-
ing economy, each worker’s skills and preferences can bematchedwith an
ideal firm type, which is reflected in wages. If workers gain a position in a
more productive firm than their ideal one (because of frictions), they will
earn less because of the need to compensate themore productive firm for
giving up on finding a more skilled worker. These nonmonotonicities
have two implications with respect to how the model maps into the AKM
methodology. First, since they distort the mapping between firm types and
firmfixed effects, the correlation betweenfixed effects no longer captures
correctly the extent of sorting in the economy. More specifically, even if
the model allows for a large degree of sorting, this empirical measure
may still be negligible. A similar finding was reported independently by
Bagger and Lentz (2014) and Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2016). However,
to the best of my knowledge, this work is the first to relate this finding1 Bagger and Lentz (2014) computed this measure on Danish data, and Tzuo Hann Law
computed it on German data, both obtaining results similar to mine. I also relate the find-
ings to those of Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti (2008), who report a measure of segregation
of worker skill.
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Allto the nonmonotonicities in wages.2 Second, the same nonmonotonicity
that helps explain the correlation between fixed effects may cause prob-
lems when attempting to elucidate the observed variance of firm fixed ef-
fects. More specifically, since each worker has a different ideal firm type,
a given firm will increase the wage of some workers (relative to another
firm) and decrease the wage of others, which may lead to a small average
“firm effect.” To my knowledge, I am the first to make this observation.
I calibrate the model by choosing a set of parameters in order to match
a number of features of the US economy. I show that the model is able to
explain a number of facts about labor market transitions, the distribution
of wages, and wage dynamics. The model also matches well the correla-
tions between fixed effects in AKM, generating a sizable correlation be-
tweenworkers and coworkers, while generating a correlationbetweenwork-
ers and firms that is negligible. However, the model generates less variance
in firm effects than can be discerned from the data analysis. This is consis-
tent with the tension induced by the nonmonotonicity described earlier.
Nonetheless, I perform a second andmuch less parsimonious calibration,
verifying that the results are robust to themore flexible parameterization.
This leads to the conclusion that neither the piece-rate model nor this
version of the sorting model is fully consistent with the reduced-form evi-
dence, suggesting that additional features should be incorporated. I dis-
cuss some possibilities for the modification of the model in the conclu-
sion. However, I note a route pursued in a companion paper (Lopes de
Melo 2015) as a particularly fruitful one, as I extend the Shimer and Smith
(2000) model to include a second dimension of firm heterogeneity: com-
pensating differentials.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II summa-
rizes the related literature, while the basics of the piece-ratemodel are pre-
sented in Section III, where I also summarize the empirical evidence and
describe my own work. Section IV is designated for the detailed descrip-
tion of the theoretical model. In Section V, I present the model calibra-
tion, aiming tomatch its output to a number of labormarket facts. Finally,
SectionVI concludes the paper, alongwith a discussion of future research.II. Related LiteratureThe work described here relates to several strands of literature. First, the
essence of the empirical methodology used throughout the paper is de-
rived from the extensive work of Abowd et al. (1999, 2002, 2004), de-
scribed earlier in this paper.2 Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) show that this mechanism does not rely on frictions and
applies to the frictionless matching model as well.
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ﬁrm wage differentials 000Second, themodel is grounded in the theoretical assignment literature.
Becker (1973) presents a model with two-sided heterogeneity, demon-
strating that, in thepresenceof complementarities inproduction, the equi-
librium exhibits perfect sorting. Shimer and Smith (2000) introduced
search frictions (via random search) in the Becker model. This approach
adds noise to the equilibrium allocations and thus requires stronger com-
plementarities for the equilibrium to exhibit positive assortative match-
ing. Eeckhout andKircher (2010) developed a directed searchmodel that
can be viewed as an intermediate case between the frictionless model and
the economy with search frictions. That framework requires fewer com-
plementarities than the search case, but more than the frictionless econ-
omy, to induce positive sorting. This approach is related to the work re-
ported by Shi (2001).
Third, authors of a recent stream of studies applied models with firm
and worker heterogeneity and matching to study labor markets. In some
of these works, matching models with worker and firm heterogeneity are
proposedwhile failing to capture assortativematching in equilibrium.No-
table examples of studies based on this framework are those conducted
by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Christensen et al. (2005), and Barlevy
(2008), among many others.
Finally, another recent stream of research is based onmodels that allow
for incorporating more elaborate patterns of matching between workers
and firms to understand labor markets. I believe that this work should
be classified in this category. In one such study, Bagger and Lentz (2014)
formulate a search model with endogenous search intensity and structur-
ally estimate it using theDanishmatchedemployer-employeedata set. This
strategy requires weaker complementarities in production to achieve pos-
itive sorting, characterized by a highly skilled worker searchingwith a higher
intensity. In their work, Lise et al. (2016) build on themodel developed by
Shimer and Smith (2000), introducing on-the-job search, a wage mech-
anism akin to that introduced by Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006),
and a dynamic process that causes firms to change productivity over time.
These authors estimate the model using National Longitudinal Study of
Youthdata and refer to its output to explain certain features of wagedynam-
ics and labor market transitions. In related work, Eeckhout and Kircher
(2011) used variations of Becker (1973) to argue that, by analyzing thewage
data alone, it is not possible to distinguish a model that features positive
sorting from that based on negative sorting. However, they also argue that
wages can provide information about the strength of sorting, which is re-
lated to the underlying mechanisms of the worker-coworker measure de-
scribed in this paper. Finally,Hagedorn, Law, andManovskii (2012) provide
results pertaining to the nonparametric identification of the model devel-
oped by Shimer and Smith (2000) usingmatched employer-employee data.This content downloaded from 129.215.019.038 on January 24, 2018 01:11:36 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
000 journal of political economy
AllIII. Wage Dispersion and Sorting at the Firm Level:
The Old ViewIn this section, I present facts related to wage dispersion and sorting at the
firm level, as well as the “face value” interpretation of these facts. First, I in-
troduce amatchingmodel with frictions that features no sorting in equilib-
rium, in line with models that are widely used in the related literature. The
model yields anumberof testablepredictions, and its structure is directly re-
lated to the wage decomposition of AKM, which I make explicit. I proceed
with summarizing the related empirical evidence, as well as presenting my
own results obtained using a Brazilian matched employer-employee data
set. I argue that the face value interpretation is incongruent with the facts,
whichmotivates the analyses and discussions in the remainder of the paper.A. A Matching Model with Heterogeneity and No SortingThismodel is based on the islandsmodel developedby Lucas andPrescott
(1974), whereby islands are reinterpreted as firms. The model is set in
continuous time and is populated by a unit mass of workers, each with a
type x drawn from distribution L(x). At each point in time, the worker ei-
ther is “in transit” or occupies an island of type y. Workers in transit are
unemployed and earn a flow benefit xb. These workers sample islands at
rate l0 by taking draws from a distribution G(y). Within islands, there are
competitive labormarkets, where workers immediately find work and earn
their marginal product w(x, y) 5 F (x, y) 5 xy. Employed workers have
the opportunity to move to island y0 at rate l1, where the new island is
drawn from the same distribution G(y0). These workers also face a risk
of exogenous displacement at rate d. The value function of unemployed,
U(x), and employed workers, W(x, y), can be expressed as follows:
rU xð Þ 5 xb 1 l0
ð
½W (x, y0) 2 U xð ÞdG(y0),
r 1 dð ÞW x, yð Þ 5 xy 1 dU xð Þ 1 l1
ð
½W (x,y0) 2 W x, yð ÞdG(y0):
The problem the workers face stems from the need to decide when to ac-
cept job opportunities in this economy. Employed workers move from one
island to another if the new island ismore productive than the current one,
y0 > y. Unemployed workers accept jobs above a reservation productivity
level R(x), which is such thatW (x,R(x)) 5 U (x). It can be easily demon-
strated that the solution to this problem has the following properties:
1. U (x) 5 xU and W (x, y) 5 xW (y).
2. R(x) 5 R and is such that W (R) 5 U .This content downloaded from 129.215.019.038 on January 24, 2018 01:11:36 AM
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ﬁrm wage differentials 000Since every worker adopts the same reservation strategy, it follows that
x ? y in equilibrium. More specifically, workers self-select into better jobs,
y; however, that matching process does not depend on the type of the
worker, resulting in no assortative matching between firm and worker
types.
This framework encompasses a class of models of bargaining and com-
petition with firm heterogeneity, which I label the “piece-rate”model.3 In
those models, y does not represent the marginal product per unit of skill,
but rather the piece rate, that is, the amount of flowoutput that the worker
appropriates in negotiations per unit of skill. Mortensen (2003) discusses
two wage-setting mechanisms that generate a piece-rate offer distribution,
one in which firms make wage offers under full commitment (i.e., as de-
scribed by Burdett and Mortensen [1998]) and another in which firms
and workers negotiate a wage in every period. The details are different,
but both sets of assumptions have the same implication: piece rates are
a strictly increasing function of firm productivity. That assertion implies
that those models have the same implications for sorting and the same
log-additive wage equation analyzed in Section III.B.B. AKM MethodologyThe wage equation implied by this model is closely related to the AKM
empirical methodology, which I make explicit. I assume that each island
in the economy represents a firm and that log wages are measured with
error: log(w) 5 log(xy) 1 ε, where ε denotes classical measurement er-
ror. The log wage of a worker i at firm J at time t can be decomposed into
two sets of fixed effects, pertinent to the worker and to the firm, respec-
tively, as well as an error term:
log½wiJ i,tð Þ 5 log xið Þ 1 log yJ i,tð Þ
 
1 εit
5 vi 1 wJ i,tð Þ 1 εit ,
(1)
where vi 5 log(xi) and wJ (i,t) 5 log ½yJ (i,t).
In order to estimate equation (1), it is necessary to have access to a
matched employer-employee data set, which follows workers and firms
over time. This equation has been estimated using data sets from several
countries, including that provided by Abowd et al. (1999), who applied
the method to French data. The econometric model is based on a num-3 This model is very similar to the ones presented in the works of Christensen et al.
(2005), Barlevy (2008), and others. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Cahuc et al. (2006),
and Bagger et al. (2014) use variations of this model, allowing wage contracts to be rene-
gotiated while on the job, akin to the model presented in Sec. IV, while still featuring the
no-sorting implication.
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Allber of identifying assumptions. First, it is assumed that the assignment of
workers to firms is uncorrelated with the error term εit. This condition is
satisfied in the baseline model if εit represents classical measurement er-
ror. Second, identification in this model is assured only within groups of
workers and firms that are connected. According to Abowd et al. (2002),
a group of persons and firms is connected when it comprises all the work-
ers who have ever worked for any of the firms in the group and all the firms
at which any of the workers have been employed at some point in time. In
typical matched employer-employee data sets, the largest group consists
of over 95 percent of the observations. Thus, restricting attention to the
largest group of the sample is a common solution. Under these assump-
tions, this statistical model can be estimated by ordinary least squares, which
is a challengingmathematical problem, since usual samples comprise data
pertaining to millions of workers and hundreds of thousands of firms.
Abowd et al. (2002) propose the use of an iterative conjugated gradient al-
gorithm, which is used by authors of most extant studies, and which I
adopt formy own calculations. Finally, it is worth noting that typical imple-
mentations of this equation include an extra term xitb, which captures the
effects of time-varying observables (e.g., the returns to experience and
time effects).
The piece-rate model allows predictions of assignment patterns and
provides a structural interpretation for the firm fixed effects. Recall that,
in themodel, worker and firm types are independent in equilibrium.One
implication of this relation is that worker and firm fixed effects should be
uncorrelated in the cross section: Corr(vi , wJ (i,t)) 5 0. Another testable im-
plication of the model is that the distribution of worker types is the same
across firms. In particular, the model predicts that worker types should
be uncorrelated to the average type of their coworkers: Corr(vi, ~vJ (i,t)) 5 0,
where ~vJ (i,t) is the mean value of v among the coworkers of worker i.4 Fi-
nally, it is worth noting that themodel provides a structural interpretation
for the fixed effects. More specifically, v reflects differences in pay due to
worker skill level, while w reflects frictional wage dispersion due to workers
finding better or worse jobs. Consequently, I also highlight the relative var-
iance between worker and firm fixed effects, Var(w)=Var(v 1 w).C. Evidence across Data SetsThis methodology has been applied to data sets from many different
countries with consistent results. Here, I summarize the results of studies
from five countries (the United States, France, Germany, Italy, and Den-4 In samples comprising large firms, this moment is identical to the index of segregation
proposed by Kremer and Maskin (1996), using v as the measure of skill: Var(vj j)=Var(v) 5
Corr(vi , vJ (i,t)), where vJ denotes the average value of v in firm J.
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ﬁrm wage differentials 000mark), alongside the results pertaining to the Brazilianmatched employer-
employee data set. I use the labor market census RAIS (Relacao Anual de
Informacoes Sociais), an administrative data set collected annually by the
Brazilian laborministry, which includes all firms in the Brazilian formal sec-
tor and provides information for all their workers. I restrict the focus to
the country’s richest state, Sao Paulo, as well as to workers who have at least
a high school diploma. In addition, the analyses pertain only to workers
who have at least a moderate degree of formal labor market attachment
and are included in the sample in at least 5 of the 11 years. These restric-
tions are intended to minimize the problem of the lack of coverage of
the informal sector of the economy. I provide further details pertinent to
the data, as well as a description of the sampling selection criteria, in Sec-
tion A of the appendix.
Table 1 summarizes the results from six countries, focusing on the mo-
ments described in Section III.A. It should first be noted that the AKM
regression has a very high explanatory power, accounting for approxi-
mately 90 percent of wage variation in most studies. It is well known that
typical observable terms in Mincer regressions (experience, gender, etc.)
have a lowexplanatory power; hence,most of the explained variation arises
from the fixed-effects terms v and w. Second, across all studies the firm
fixed effects also account for a sizable share of wage dispersion, whereby
Var(w)=Var(v 1 w) ranges from 0.19 to 0.32. Third, across all data sets the
value of Corr(v, w) either is very close to zero (as in the case of the United
States, Italy, or Brazil) or takes a small negative value (as in France or Ger-
many). If we interpret this evidence using the piece-rate model, most of
the wage dispersion is driven by worker heterogeneity, while frictions still
account for a significant fraction of wage dispersion, as reflected by the
value of Var(w)=Var(v 1 w) at around 20–30 percent. In addition, the ev-
idence thatCorr(v,w) is close to zero inmost data sets seems supportive of
the model implication of no sorting in labor markets.5 However, this last
conclusion is incongruent with the last piece of evidence, as Corr(v, ~v)
ranges from .17 to .52 across data sets. This correlation suggests a substan-
tial degree of clustering of workers across firms based on their skill level,
which contradicts the implication that the distribution of worker skills is
the same across firms.D. Sorting across SubmarketsIn Section III.C, I concluded that the piece-ratemodel is inconsistent with
the high degree of clustering of workers and coworkers reflected in the
values of Corr(v, ~v) across a number of data sets. In order for the piece-rate5 Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Christensen et al. (2005) use this moment to justify
absence of a sorting equilibrium.
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ﬁrm wage differentials 000model to explain those facts, the clustering can be assumed to be driven
mechanically by composition. The argument supporting this strategy is
as follows. Assume that the data are generated by the model presented
in Section III.A but separately across “groups” of workers and firms. A firm
under this interpretation consists of the set of workers who belong to the
respective “group” in a given establishment. Using an example of lawyers
and law firms and call centers and their workers as two separate submar-
kets, it can be assumed that, on average, the lawyers have a higher skill level
relative to call center employees. Even though within groups there would
be no firm-worker sorting, the law firms are in greater need of highly skilled
workers, which would result in clusters of suchworkers in these firms.Most
empirical implementation of piece-rate models allow for this type of sort-
ing patterns by assuming existence of submarkets divided by education lev-
els or occupation categories.6 It is worth noting that, in a more general set-
ting with assortative matching, the correlations within groups do not need
to be smaller than the unconditional correlation. This can be shown on an
example of managers and maintenance staff as the two groups, assuming,
once again, that most managers are more skilled than maintenance work-
ers. Assume that firm 1 hires both better managers and maintenance staff
than firm 2, but it has a higher ratio of staff to managers. It is easy to con-
struct cases inwhich the average skill level in the two firms is identical, even
though segregation within groups exists.
I show evidence on this hypothesis using the Brazilian sample. To do so,
I first divide the data into groups consisting of combinations of education
categories and occupations, sectors, or location data. I compute the value
of the AKM moments for each of the groups before calculating the aver-
age across groups, weighting by the size of each group: E ½Corr(v, wG),
E ½Corr(v, ~vjG), and E ½Var(wjG)=Var(v 1 wjG). I restrict the sample to
firms with at least two workers of a given group and groups with at least
1,000 observations and multiple firms. The results are displayed in table 2.
Since the resulting sample is different for each case, I also include the
unconditional moments. In all cases, the worker-coworkermeasure is well
above zero, and in the case of education/occupations, it is even greater
than the unconditional one, which suggests that the results are not driven
by composition. It is also worth pointing out that the relative dispersion in
firm fixed effects, Var(w)=Var(v 1 w), is higher within groups than over-
all, irrespective of the choice of groups. This is consistent with the results
obtained by Bagger et al. (2014), who report values of Var(w)=Var(v) be-
tween 1.13 and 2 using Danish data and three educational groups. This
congruence in findings suggests that some forces that are not captured6 For example, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) allow for seven occupation classes using
French data, and Christensen et al. (2005) allow for six occupation classes using Danish
data. In addition, see the discussion preceding Postel-Vinay and Robin’s n. 19.
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Allby the model, such as compensating differentials between sectors or dif-
ferences in local prices/amenities, are not the main component behind
the variability in w.IV. A Sorting Model with FrictionsHaving concluded that the sorting patterns in the data are inconsistent
with the piece-rate model, I introduce a model that incorporates sorting
in equilibrium. In this section, I outline the main features of the model,
leaving the details to the appendix. Themodel shares the basic character-
istics of that proposed by Shimer and Smith (2000) in that it describes an
economy comprising heterogeneous workers and firms, as well as search
frictions. Themain innovation that I introduce into themodel stems from
the addition of on-the-job search, which occurs in both a voluntary and
involuntary manner. This is important because a large fraction of employ-
ment separations involve job-to-job transitions (e.g., Fallick and Fleisch-
man 2004) and because it substantially affects the way frictions shapewage
inequality (e.g., Hornstein et al. 2011).A. The EnvironmentThis is a continuous-time economy, with a unitmass of workers and amea-
sure J of jobs. I assign a value x ∈ ½x, x to each worker and y ∈ ½y, y to each
job, where the worker index is supposed to capture his or her level of
human capital, whereas the job index reflects entrepreneurial talent, dif-
ferences in the stock of capital, and so forth. It is assumed that these types
are observable and the distributions are known to all agents. Workers and
jobs are distributed according to density l(x) and g(y), respectively. In this
economy, each firm represents a collection of jobs of a certain type with-
out cross-complementarities. In line with the work of Shimer and SmithTABLE 2
Correlation within Groups
Group
Number of
Groups Observations
Unconditional Within Groups
(A) (B) (C) (A) (B) (C)
Education 2 15.8 million .05 .52 .33 .07 .48 .45
Education/occupationsa 351 9.5 million .03 .55 .32 .00 .57 .41
Education/sectors 788 15.6 million .05 .52 .33 .02 .40 .36
Education/location 510 15.5 million .05 .52 .33 .06 .44 .43This content dow
 use subject to University ofnloaded from
 Chicago Pres 129.215.019.038
s Terms and Cond on January 24, 201
itions (http://www.8 01:1
journa1:36 A
ls.uchiNote.—In the sample, two levels of education (high school diploma and college degree)
are included. Occupation data are given at a three-digit level, while the sectors are presented
using five digits. Location data are at the municipality level. (A) 5 Corr(v, w), (B) 5
Corr(v, ~v), and (C) 5 Var(w)=Var(v 1 w).
a Occupation classification changed after 2002, so I use these data only for the period
1995–2002.M
cago.edu/t-and-c).
ﬁrm wage differentials 000(2000), the equilibrium characterization is initially described in terms of
jobs. However, when themodel is applied to the data at the firm level, the
notion of firms will be applied. I further assume existence of a measure E
of firms, with distribution u(y). For each value of y, all jobs are evenly dis-
tributed across the firms of such a type such that
E
ðy
y
n(y0)u(y0)dy0 5 J
ðy
y
g(y0)dy0,
where n(y) is the mass of jobs per firm of type y.
We can study a stationary environment in which workers and jobs are
matched via a random search technology. Workers search for jobs while
both employed and unemployed, whereas firms offering jobs search for
suitable candidates only while these positions are vacant. In addition, un-
employedworkers encounter vacancies at a ratelU, while employedworkers
come across vacancies at rate lE. Matches are dissolved either exogenously
at rate d or when workers face “reallocation shocks” at rate lR, which forces
the worker to leave his or her current employer and immediately encoun-
ter a new firm. As discussed by Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) and
Lopes deMelo (2007), these shocks help explain the high fraction of job-
to-job transitions that involve a wage cut. On the firm side, vacancies are
compared with the characteristics of unemployed workers at a rate lF, em-
ployed workers at rate lFE, and workers subjected to reallocation shocks at
rate lFR. Even though these rates are exogenous for our purposes, they
need to satisfy steady-state conditions, which I describe in the appendix.
When a worker of type x is matched with a job of type y, this results in
flow output F(x, y), which is assumed to be increasing in both arguments.
Unemployed workers receive a flow value b(x) and vacant jobs are as-
signed zero flow value. Workers and jobs discount time at rate r and have
linear preferences over income and flow profits, respectively.
The presence of search frictions yields match rents, which requires one
to specify a rule to divide the match surplus between the two parties. I fol-
low the approach developed byCahuc et al. (2006) andothers and assume
that wages are determined via a sequential auctions bargaining game. In
this game, the surplus of the match is apportioned by applying a general-
ized Nash bargaining rule, where the worker receives a share b, and the
outside options available to workers depend on their labormarket history.
I describe more details of the game in the next section as well as in the ap-
pendix.B. Description of the EquilibriumThe equilibrium of this economy consists of value functions and distri-
butions such that workers and firms match optimally, and the distribu-
tions satisfy steady-state flow conditions. It is useful to introduce the fol-This content downloaded from 129.215.019.038 on January 24, 2018 01:11:36 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
000 journal of political economy
Alllowing notation. An employed worker of type x working for a firm of type
y with a contracted wage of w has value W(x, y, w). Alternatively, if this
worker is unemployed, his or her value is U(x). A job of type y that pays
w has value J(x, y, w) if matched with a worker of type x or V(y) if vacant.
The surplus of a match between worker x and job y is given by S(x, y) ;
½W (x, y, w) 2 U (x) 1 ½ J (x, y, w) 2 V (y). Note that surplus of thematch
does not depend on wages because workers and firms have linear pref-
erences, in line with our wage-setting mechanism. The steady-state den-
sity of employed matches is e(x, y). The density of unemployed workers
for each type is u(x), and the density of vacancies is v(y). Finally, the un-
employment rate, u, and the number of vacancies in the economy, v, are
also determined endogenously.
In this frictional economy, workers and jobs are paired at a Poisson
rate, whereby they can match or not. Moreover, upon matching, the sur-
plus of the match is split between the two via a Nash bargaining protocol,
whereby a fraction b of the surplus is given to workers and the remainder
is received by firms. One important element of the bargaining protocol is
the presence of outside options for both workers and firms partaking in
negotiations. For firms, this option is always the value of keeping a vacancy,
V(y). For workers, it will depend on their labor market status. When com-
ing from unemployment or after facing a reallocation shock, the outside
option is the value of search while unemployed, U(x). Then, as employed
workers find newmatches, they use them as leverage in negotiations, gain-
ing the full surplus of that match as bargaining power. This can be ex-
plained using the example of an individual currently working for firm y
with second-best option y0. In this case, his or her outside option isU (x) 1
S(x, y0). When this worker is offered a job by a new employer y00, three pos-
sibilities emerge. First, if S(x, y00) < S(x, y0), there is no change. Second, if
S(x, y0) < S(x, y00) < S(x, y), the worker remains with the current employer
but uses the new firm to leverage his or her negotiation position, and the
new outside option becomesU (x) 1 S(x, y00). Finally, if S(x, y00) > S(x, y),
then the worker leaves the current employer, whereby his or her alterna-
tive option becomes U (x) 1 S(x, y). Note that workers and firms match
only if they generate positive surplus S(x, y) > 0, and when workers are
offered employment in other firms, they choose to work at the firm that
generates the highest surplus.
Our assumptions imply that the expected value of unemployed work-
ers is equal to
rU xð Þ 5 b xð Þ 1 blU
ðy
y
½S(x, y0)1v(y0)dy0, (2)
where ½A1 5 AI ½A > 0. In the appendix, I show the analogous equation
for V(y), which is similar to this one but accounts for the fact that vacan-This content downloaded from 129.215.019.038 on January 24, 2018 01:11:36 AM
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ﬁrm wage differentials 000cies are also considered by employed workers. I also show in the appen-
dix that the surplus of the match can be computed as
(r 1 d 1 lR)S x, yð Þ 5 F x, yð Þ 2 rU xð Þ 2 rV yð Þ
1 blR
ðy
y
½S(x, y0)1v(y0)dy0
1 blE
ðy
y
½S(x, y0) 2 S x, yð Þ1v(y0)dy0:
(3)
The first three terms on the right-hand side of the equation are standard
and arepresented in thework of Shimer andSmith (2000). In addition, al-
thoughmatches subject to reallocation shocks are eliminated, the worker
can appropriate a share b of the surplus of a new match if he or she finds
a suitable one. Finally, workers who find better jobs are able to extract a
share b of the excess surplus of the new job versus the old one.
In addition to introducing the asset value equations, the equilibrium
of thismodel includes the endogenous distributions e(x, y), v(y), and u(x).
In a steady state, those are fixed by equating the inbound and outbound
flows of matches of particular types, as well as market clearing conditions.
These are described in the appendix.
One very useful property of this framework is that S(x, y),U(x), and V(y)
can be computed jointly with the endogenous distributions without the
need to compute wages. This facilitates the computation of the equilibrium,
since it is not necessary to keep track of the second-best job as a state var-
iable.With knowledge of the value functions and equilibriumdistributions,
the implied wage function can be retrieved by using the surplus sharing
conditions imposed by Nash bargaining. The wage of worker x, working
for firm y, with second-best option q satisfies the condition
W x, y, w x, y, qð Þð Þ 2 U xð Þ 1 S x, qð Þ½  5 b S x, yð Þ 2 S x, qð Þ½ , (4)
whereW(x, y,w(x, y, y0)) is computed via an asset value equation described
in the appendix. Having the wage function allows the flow profits of a job
to be computed as
p x, y, qð Þ 5 F x, yð Þ 2 w x, y, qð Þ:C. Sorting, Wages, and IntuitionNext, I illustrate some properties of equilibrium. As emphasized by Becker
(1973) and Shimer and Smith (2000), complementarities in production
are themain driver behind assortative matching: positive (negative) com-
plementarities inducepositive (negative) assortativematching, PAM(NAM).This content downloaded from 129.215.019.038 on January 24, 2018 01:11:36 AM
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AllI consider both types of complementarity and illustrate the case of an econ-
omy without on-the-job search, lE 5 lR 5 0, which helps in developing
intuition. In this case, there are no poaching offers, and the wage func-
tion depends on the worker and firm types as follows:
wNOJ x, yð Þ 5 b F x, yð Þ 2 rV yð Þ½  1 1 2 bð ÞU xð Þ: (5)
It is easy to see that U 0(x) > 0 and V 0(y) > 0, which implies that wages are
increasing with worker skill level, whereas they may be nonmonotone
with respect to firm productivity. We can rearrange equation (5) and ob-
tain wNOJ(x, y) 5 U (x) 1 bS(x, y). This implies that wages are at their
minimum at the edges of thematching set (where S(x, y) 5 0), which en-
sures nonmonotone wages for all workers with interior matching sets.
These nonmonotonicities are a natural reflection of job scarcity and opti-
mal assignment. Indeed, in the matching economy, each worker has an
ideal job (the one that generates the highest surplus), andworkers choose
them on the basis of wages. Thus, if the ideal match of a worker with mid-
level skills is amid-level productivity firm, then that is the firm that will pay
him or her the most. Highly productive firms would pay that worker less
because hiring him or her entails giving up on the opportunity to hire a
more suitable worker, which is taken into account in negotiations. It is
worth noting that similar nonmonotonicities also emerge in the profit
function, p(x, y, q), this time with respect to x.
I show two examples of symmetric economies in which b 5 0.5, J 5 1,
b(h) 5 0, and l 5 g, one with supermodular technology and another
with submodular technology.7 Figure 1 depicts plots of log output and
log wages as a function of job productivity, where each line represents
a different percentile of worker skill. For each worker type, the support
of the plot includes only the firms that belong to his or her matching set,
which provides a visual representation of these sets.We can see that highly
skilled workers match with highly productive firms in the case of PAM and
firms characterized by low productivity in the case of NAM, while the con-
verse is true for low-skilled workers. It is also evident that in bothNAMand
PAM cases wages are increasing in x, whereas they are nonmonotone with
respect to y, as described above.
This nonmonotonicity of wages with respect to y suggests that the firm
fixed effects in a wage regression,w, are unlikely to capture the underlying
level of firm productivity well. This has two implications with respect to
mapping the primitives of the model to the empirical fixed-effects meth-
odology. First, the correlation Corr(v, w) is distorted and thus no longer7 I use a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function F (x, y) 5 (0:5xh1
0:5yh)1=h, where h → 0 (Cobb-Douglas) on the supermodular example and h 5 3 on the
submodular example. I also assume that the distributions are lognormal with variance 1,
r 5 0:005, d 5 0:02, and lU 5 0:3.
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FIG. 1.—Equilibrium output and wages with PAM (panel A) and NAM (panel B), with-
out on-the-job search. Each line refers to a different percentile of worker skill, and for each
worker the line includes only the firms that belong to his or her matching set.This content downloaded from 129.215.019.038 on January 24, 2018 01:11:36 AM
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Allaccurately reflects the degree of sorting between the model primitives x
and y. Second, the same nonmonotonicity tends to suppress the amount
of dispersion in w generated by the model. As noted previously, workers
each have their ideal firm type. Thus, when the difference in wages for
a worker in two firms is compared, wNOJ(x, y) 2 wNOJ(x, y0), the outcome
may be positive for some workers and negative for others, introducing
ambiguity into the average “firm effect” onwages. This second point is well
illustrated by anexampledescribedbyEeckhout andKircher (2011), using
a simplified version of the frictional matching model with uniform distri-
bution of types. In that example, when applying the AKM methods to
the equilibriumwage function of themodel, the implied firmfixed effects
do not vary with their type regardless of the degree of frictions, imply-
ing that Var(w) 5 0.8 Recall that Var(w) ≫ 0 on the data, which may be
a challenge for themodel tomatch. In general, the variability of w will de-
pend on the joint distribution of worker skill and productivity in equilib-
rium. Consequently, when parameterizing the model, in our approach,
we can allow for very flexible shapes for the distributions of worker skill
and job productivity.
The same graph suggests that wage data can still be useful for inferring
the strength of sorting for two reasons. First, in this model, the highly
skilled workers work for the high-productivity firms in the case of PAM
(or the low-productivity in the case of NAM) and thus have highly skilled
coworkers. Second, wages aremonotonic in x, suggesting that the relation-
ship between worker and coworker wages reflects that of the primitives.
Thus, the moment Corr(v, ~v) is a promising way to measure the intensity
of sorting in the economy. One limitation of themeasure is that it cannot
distinguish the sign of sorting (PAM or NAM), just its intensity.
In sum, to ensure that this model is consistent with the empirical evi-
dence presented in Section III, the economy should exhibit a substantial
degree of sorting, as reflected by Corr(v, ~v), whereas Corr(v, w) would be
biased downward because of nonmonotonicity in wages. However, this
nonmonotonicity cannot be too strong, such that the model still yields
Var(w) ≫ 0. Whether the model can meet those targets simultaneously
is a quantitative matter and is investigated in Section V.
On-the-job search and sequential auctions make this relationship more
complex because the wage function includes extra terms that reflect the
potential gains to the worker from on-the-job search that are included in
the negotiations and depress workers’ wages. This mechanism can invali-
date the monotonicity in x described above. To explain this argument, we8 See their eq. (18) and the discussion in Sec. IV.A. However, the authors do not discuss
the implications for the variance of those fixed effects, only the implications for sorting.
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ﬁrm wage differentials 000can consider the example of the wage function of workers hired from un-
employment, q 5 ∅, in an economy in which workers have low bargain-
ing power, b 5 0, and b(x) 5 b. Equations (2), (7), and (4) imply that
wb50 x, y,∅ð Þ 5 b 2 lE
ðy
y
½S(x, y0) > 0
minfS(x, y0), S x, yð Þgv(y0)dy0:
Now, let us consider any firm y0 with an interior matching set and the
least-skilled employee of that firm, x(y0). Note that by construction
S(x(y0), y0) 5 0, which implies that this worker will have the highest wage
among the workers just hired from unemployment to take positions in
that firm. Higher values of b, an increasing b(x), and the arrival of com-
peting offers, q ≠ ∅, all counteract this force and restoremonotonicity in
worker skill level.V. CalibrationIn this section, I select a parameterization of the model and set the pa-
rameters in order to match a number of labor market facts emphasized
by the empirical job search literature (e.g., Jolivet et al. 2006). I perform
two calibrations. First, I select a “parsimonious” parameterization and do
not include the moments described in Section III.C as part of the target
moments. I show that, while themodel succeeds inmatching the targeted
moments, it fails to explain some of the facts highlighted in Section III.C.
In particular, the model generates less variation in firm fixed effects w
than observed in the data. For this reason, in the method presented in
Section E of the appendix, I adopt a more flexible parameterization and
include the aforementioned facts as target moments. This approach im-
proves the fit of the model but still fails to reproduce some aspects of
the data.A. CalibrationIn this section, I describe model calibration, performed by selecting pa-
rameters that guarantee that the model matches a number of features
of the US data. In order to do so, I need to make certain parametric as-
sumptions. First, I assume that the production function takes a CES form
F (x, y) 5 ½Jxh 1 (1 2 J)yh1=h, which allows for a wide degree of comple-
mentarities. If h < 1, the production function is supermodular, whereas if
h > 1, it is submodular. Second, I assume that the flow value of leisure for
the worker takes the following form: b(x) 5 bF (x, f(x)), where b ∈ ½0, 1,
and f(x) denotes the optimal job assigned to worker x in the frictionlessThis content downloaded from 129.215.019.038 on January 24, 2018 01:11:36 AM
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Alleconomy.9 I posit that this is a parsimonious way to allowmore productive
workers to be more productive in nonmarket activities as well. I assume
that worker and firm types follow a lognormal distributionwith zeromean
and, respectively, jW and jF standard deviations. It is worth noting that the
mean of these distributions cannot be distinguished from J, which is why
they are set to zero.10
Following the discussion in Section IV.C, I restrict h < 1 (positive com-
plementarities), as the empirical measure of sorting helps identify only
the strength of sorting, not its sign. I set the discount rate tomatch a 5 per-
cent annual discount rate. I also set J 5 1 to ensure that, if frictions are
removed from the economy, every worker and job would find a match. Fi-
nally, I also set J5 0.5. Thus, nine parameters remain, which are selected
in order to match a series of facts about labor markets emphasized in the
job search literature. Although the model performs in continuous time,
in practice, I approximate the economy with the discrete-time correspon-
dent, setting the periodicity to 1 week. I simulate the path of 10,000 work-
ers who are matched to 1,000 firms over a 7-year period. These numbers
are chosen tomatch the length and the ratio of workers per firmof theUS
matched employer-employee data set, as shown byWoodcock (2015). The
number of workers is smaller than that found in typicalmatched employer-
employee data sets. However, I found that increasing this number has lit-
tle effect on the results, while it increases the computational time substan-
tially. I present results using a much larger sample (300,000 workers) for
the calibrated parameter values. I compute themoments on a yearly basis
before calculating the average across years. The conditional moments are
computed (both data and model), restricting attention to workers who
remain employed throughout the year and experience at least one job
transition.
In order to initialize the sample, I begin with a sample of unemployed
workers drawn fromdistribution l(x) discretized to a 100-point grid and sim-
ulate their paths for a 10-year period, in order to start the economy in a
steady state. From that point, I collect 7 years of data, which is the basis of
the calculations.On thefirmside, I discretize thefirm typegrid to 500points
and allocate the firms to those grid points according to distribution u(y),
which I assume is such that firms have an equal number of total jobs (va-9 The function f(x) is such that
Ð 1
x l(x
0)dx 0 5 J
Ð 1
f(x) g(y
0)dy0.
10 This holds because we can always rewrite
F x, yð Þ 5 J axð Þh1 1 2 Jð Þ byð Þh½ 1=h∝ Ja
h
Jah 1 1 2 Jð Þbh x
h 1
1 2 Jð Þbh
Jah 1 1 2 Jð Þbh y
h
 1=h
5 J0xh 1 1 2 J0
 
yh
 1=h
:
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ﬁrm wage differentials 000cant andfilled).11Whenever theworker finds a firm, he or she takes a draw
from the (endogenous) distribution of vacancies and is allocated ran-
domly to one of the firms at the corresponding type. Note that the choice
of u(y) does not affect the wage function,matching decisions, the distribu-
tion of vacancies, or the joint densities of worker and job types. As a result,
I have found that this distribution has little impact on themoments under
consideration.
I perform two sets of calibrations, one for workers with a high school
education and another one for workers with at least a college degree.
It is well documented that there are substantial differences in unemploy-
ment inflow rates across workers with different levels of education (e.g.,
Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin 2010), and thismodel is not designed to explain
those endogenously. I select a number of data moments as targets for the
calibration. Next, I discuss identification informally, thus providing some
level of intuition as to why that moment should be directly affected by
that parameter.
First, I have the transition rates lU, d, and lE, which have a clear associ-
ation with the observed unemployment inflow rates, unemployment out-
flow rates, and job-to-job transition rates. These can be computed in the
model as follows:
UErate 5 lU
ðy
y
ðx
x
½S(x 0, y0) > 0u(x 0)v(y0)dx 0dy0,
EUrate 5 d 1 lR
ðy
y
ðy
y
ðx
x
½S(x 0, y00) ≤ 0e(x 0, y0)v(y00)dx 0dy0dy00,
EErate 5
ðy
y
ðy
y
ðx
x
flR ½S(x 0, y00) > 0 1 lE ½S(x 0, y00) > S(x 0, y0)g
 e(x 0, y0)v(y00)dx 0dy0dy00:
I use Current Population Surveymicrodata for the period 1996–2003 and
compute theUErate corrected for time aggregation for both educational
groups following the methodology proposed by Shimer (2012). I focus
on this period tomatch the time span used to compute the EErate target.
Next, I use unemployment rates by education provided by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (4.3 percent for high school graduates and 2.2 percent
for college graduates) and adopt the standard steady-state approximation
u ≈ EUrate=(EUrate 1 EUrate) to compute the EUrate of each group.
Finally, I make use of the results reported by Nagypál (2008), who pro-11 There are more grid points on the support of firm types to prevent ties on the worker
job decisions, including job-to-job transitions. I use interpolation methods to obtain values
on the expanded grid points.
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Allvides EErates by education level for the same period.12 The values are
shown in table 3.
Next, I use a series of moments related to the distribution of wages and
wage dynamics to calibrate the parameters jW, jF, lR, and b. I employ data
from the SIPP 1996 panel, which tracks workers at a weekly frequency and
is well suited for measuring job transitions. First, increasing jW increases
the overall variability of log wages Var(w), which I use as a target moment.
In this environment, characterized by frictions and firm heterogeneity,
the same worker can be paid differently in different firms, and this is af-
fected by the extent of firm heterogeneity, jF. Consequently, I use as a tar-
get moment the variance of wage changes for workers who experience a
job-to-job transition, Var(DwjJJT). As documented by Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002), Jolivet et al. (2006), and Lopes de Melo (2007), a substan-
tial fraction of job-to-job transitions involve a wage cut, which is hard to
match in a model in which workers are permitted to switch jobs only for
monetary gains. Thus, I set the rate of involuntary reallocation shocks,
lR, to match the fraction of wage cuts that involve job-to-job transitions,
Pr(Dw < 0j JJT). In addition, recall that in this model, there is a certain
extent of backloading in wages as workers start jobs at low wages and ne-
gotiate increases as they consider roles in other firms. The extent of back-
loading is affected by the parameter b, whereby higher b corresponds to
themore immediatewagegains. In fact, as shownbyPostel-Vinay andRobin
(2002), if b is very low, when switching jobs, some workers may accept a
wage cut in exchange for future wage growth. Thus, I set b to match the
mean wage gain in job-to-job transitions, E(Dwj JJT).
At this point, only b and h remain, whereby the latter controls the de-
gree of complementarity in the production function. Without frictions,
sorting is perfect and positive, as long as h < 1. In the presence of frictions,
workers and firms tolerate mismatch, the extent of which will depend on
the degree of complementarities. As discussed in Section V, the moment
Corr(v, ~v) captures well the intensity of sorting among workers. Thus, the
value of this moment must be set as a means of fixing h. I choose a target
value of .4 for Corr(v, ~v), which corresponds to the case of Denmark and
tends toward the top of the range found across data sets (.17 in Italy and
~.5 in Brazil andGermany). In the extended calibration presented in Sec-
tion E of the appendix, I also test an alternative value of .2 for each edu-
cation group. Finally, I need to set the parameter value of home produc-
tion, b. I follow the approach used by Shimer (2005) and assume that b is
such that the average value of b(x) is 40 percent of the average wage, a12 I adopt her results using Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data be-
cause they pertain to time aggregation. To obtain the implied EErates, I use her reported
shares of job-to-job transitions as a fraction of all separations (49.7 percent for high school
and 58.5 percent for college).
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ﬁrm wage differentials 000number derived from the average replacement rate from the US unem-
ployment insurance system.However, since the pool of unemployed work-
ersmay differ from the overall pool of workers, I compute b(x)=E(wjx) for
each worker type and then average over the distribution of unemployed
workers, obtaining the target
ðx
x
b(x 0)
E(wjx 0) u(x
0)dx 0:
I choose the combination of parameters that minimize the distance be-
tween the target moments and the model moments.13 The calibration re-
sults are shown in table 3, panels A and B. As can be seen from table 3, the
model is successful inmatching the proposedmoments, especially for the
sample of college-educated workers (there are too many wage cuts in job
switches in the sample comprising workers with a high school education).
When considering the estimated parameters, it is worth mentioning that
there is a substantial difference in the estimated degree of complemen-
tarities pertaining to the high school versus the college sample.While both
h values (20.99 and 0.59, respectively) reflect supermodularity, the degree
of complementarities in the market populated by workers with a high
school diploma is stronger. The intuition for that result is that there are
“more frictions” in the market serving high school graduates (lU =d ≈ 30
in high school and lU =d ≈ 50 in college), which leads to less sorting.TABLE 3
Calibration Targets, Model Fit, and Parameters
Target
A. Calibration Targets
B. Calibrated ParameterHigh School College
Data Model Data Model High School College
UErate .412 .412 .373 .367 lU .495 .404
EUrate .019 .017 .008 .008 d .016 .008
EErate .018 .020 .012 .013 lE .031 .034
Var(w) .22 .224 .303 .302 jW .151 .163
Corr(v, ~v) .4 .394 .4 .400 h 2.986 .587Ð x
x
b(x 0)
E(wjx 0) u(x
0)dx 0 .4 .405 .4 .400 b .048 .043
Var(DwFJJT)a .096 .092 .090 .086 jF .296 .252
Pr(Dw < 0FJJT) .27 .375 .260 .289 lR .010 .004
E(DwFJJT) .039 .042 .047 .050 b .147 .16713 I use the global op
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AllHowever, since I am imposing the same degree of sorting on both mar-
kets, Corr(v, ~v) 5 :4, I need stronger complementarities to achieve that.B. AKM RegressionGiven that the model has been calibrated to match several features of the
US economy, its ability to reproduce theAKMempiricalmoments needs to
be verified. Table 4 summarizes the results. First, as expected, the worker-
coworker correlation Corr(v, ~v) (a targeted moment) captures the “true”
degree of sorting (the value of Corr(x, ~x)) in the economy quite well. Sec-
ond, while the Corr(v, w) value is much lower than its theoretical coun-
terpart, this value is still well above that measured in any of the data sets
described in Section III. Third, and perhaps more significant, the disper-
sion in firmfixed effects, Var(w)=Var(v 1 w), is substantially smaller than
that observed in the data. The intuition for these results derives from the
nonmonotonicities explained in Section IV.C. Since they distort themap-
ping between true firm types, y, and firmfixed effects,w, themodel is con-
sistent with a low value for Corr(v, w) despite incorporating positive sort-
ing. However, the same nonmonotonicities reduce the dispersion in w, as
firms determine the wages of different workers in different ways. In addi-
tion, I included results of a simulation based on a sample of 300,000 work-
ers (instead of 10,000) to establish whether sample size affects the results.
As can be seen, the results based on the larger sample are very similar to
the baseline results.VI. Conclusion and Future DirectionsMy objective in this paper was to provide a structural interpretation for
the facts pertinent to firm-wage differentials and worker-firm sorting ob-
tained by adopting the AKMmethodology. First, I reviewed reduced-form
evidence from the AKM regressions, includingmy own, focusing on threeTABLE 4
AKM Moments on Calibrated Economy
AKM Moments Data
Model Model (Large Sample)a
High School College High School College
Corr(v, w) 2.01 .175 .338 .173 .335
Corr(v, ~v) .40 .394 .400 .397 .395
Var(w)=Var(v 1 w) .22 .023 .042 .023 .044
R 2 .89 .892 .943 .890 .942
Corr(x, y) . . . .486 .473 .488 .478
Corr(x, ~y) . . . .415 .411 .418 .409
E ½Var(wjx)=Var(w) . . . .198 .122 .200 .121This content do
 use subject to University ownloaded 
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ﬁrm wage differentials 000moments: a significant variance of firm fixed effects, worker and firms
fixed effects that are uncorrelated, and a significant correlation between
the fixed effects of workers and their coworkers. I demonstrated that these
three moments are inconsistent with the “face value” interpretation pro-
vided by the piece-rate model. This is the case because the degree of co-
worker segregation that I documented violates the implication that the
worker skill distribution is independent across firms. I extended the anal-
yses further and verified that this fact is not driven by composition using
Brazilian data.
In the next step of the investigation, I used a natural alternative to ex-
plain those facts: a frictionalmodel that allows for assortativematching. A
clear challenge for the model was to generate a zero correlation between
fixed effects while allowing for sorting patterns. I showed that the model
incorporates a mechanism that allows for the fact that the wage function
is nonmonotone in a firm’s productivity, which distorts the mapping be-
tween firm types and fixed effects, biasing the correlation. This nonmono-
tonicity does not affect themappingbetweenworker types and their wages;
hence, the worker-coworker measure is not contaminated and accurately
captures the degree of sorting in the economy. However, the same mech-
anism can generate problems in matching with respect to the first fact. As
I have shown, because wages are nonmonotone, a firm will pay some work-
ersmore andother workers less, whichdepresses thedispersion infirmfixed
effects. Thus, it is a quantitative matter if the model can succeed or not in
matching the data. To address that issue, I calibrated themodel toUSdata,
confirming that the model can explain a number of labor market transi-
tion characteristics, wage dynamics, and the wage distribution. Themodel
also performs well in explaining the correlations of the AKM regression.
However, themodel generates too little dispersion in firmfixed effects rel-
ative to thedata, whichcanbeexplainedby the aforementionednonmono-
tonicities. The result remains valid after robustness checks with amuch less
parsimonious calibration.
These findings lead to the conclusion that neithermodel fully succeeds
inmatching the data, indicating that features need tobe changedor added.
I discuss a few possibilities. One possible extension would be to allow for
types of workers or jobs to be stochastic. It is clear from the frictionless
matching model that this has strong implications for the variance of the
fixed effects. The argument is as follows. The model described in Sec-
tion IV with J5 1, no frictions, and a production function such that Fhp >
0 can be applied. This is a version of the Becker (1973) marriage model,
which features perfect assortative matching (top worker with top firm,
and vice versa) under such a parameterization. Now, the same economy
can be replicated from one period to the next, allowing workers to switch
types while keeping the distribution unchanged. In such a scenario, firms
will hire new workers, but the new hires will have the same level of skillThis content downloaded from 129.215.019.038 on January 24, 2018 01:11:36 AM
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Alland will be paid the same wage. Therefore, a set of firm dummies would
explain 100 percent of wage variation (over both periods), whereas the
same is not true for worker dummies. Naturally, one could reverse the ar-
gument and fix worker types while allowing firm types to change. In that
case, worker dummies would explain 100 percent of wage variation. It is
not well known how these conclusions change when both types change
simultaneously and how these interact with frictions.14 Second, since the
coworker measure points to sorting between workers, another extension
would be to consider explicitly models with team production and cross-
complementarities in production. This is a challenging and promising
area of research.
Another promising direction for future investigations is the one I pur-
sued in the companionpaper (Lopes deMelo 2015). In that work, I extend
the frictional sorting model to include firm attributes that affect workers’
preferences, in line with the theory of compensating differentials (e.g.,
Rosen 1986). That makes the model analysis more complex because it re-
quires identifying two distinct dimensions of firm heterogeneity (firm pro-
ductivity and the amenities). In that model, there are still complementar-
ities in production between worker skill level and firm productivity, which
induces assortative matching. Moreover, there is the compensating differ-
ential that shifts the wages of all workers in the same direction, which re-
sembles the firm fixed effects in the AKM methodology. Consequently,
the model can explain the correlations in AKM, as well as generate a fair
amount of dispersion in firm fixed effects.Appendix
A. Data Description and Sample Selection
I use the labormarket census RAIS (Relacao Anual de Informacoes Sociais), an ad-
ministrative data set collected annually by the Brazilian Labor Ministry, which in-
cludes all firms in the Brazilian formal sector and provides information for all their
workers. Theministry collects demographic informationof all workers, such as age,
education, and sex, along with some information about establishments, such as
sector and location. In addition, it provides information about the job, such as
the average wage earned during that year (the measure I use), the wage in Decem-
ber, the average number of hours worked, occupation, dates of admission and res-
ignation, type of contract, and causes for the termination of employment.15
I use data pertaining to an 11-year period, ranging from 1995 to 2005. Although
data from previous years were available, I opted for this time frame because, until14 Lise et al. (2016) allow for stochastic job types but consider only the implications for
the correlation between fixed effects, Corr(v, w).
15 The remaining variables are race, nationality, a measure of disability, and the juridic
nature of the firm.
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ﬁrm wage differentials 0001994, Brazil suffered from extremely high inflation, which caused serious mea-
surement problems in variables such as wages and also had structural implications
for the macroeconomy. I restrict the sample to the state of Sao Paulo, which is the
richest state of the country, contributing to the GDP and industrial production by
over 13 percent and 30 percent, respectively. Sao Paulo is characterized by a much
smaller level of informal employment relative to all other regions of the country.
Work informality is an important feature in Brazil, just as it is in many developing
countries, and is excluded in the analysis. Furthermore, RAIS is an enormous data
set, and reducing the number of states makes the data employed in analyses more
manageable.
I start with a sample of 25,856,195 observations pertaining to workers aged be-
tween 20 and 60, with at least a high school diploma, employed in the state of Sao
Paulo, in the 1995–2005 period, for whom wage observations are available and
who worked for a particular firm during the full year. I then apply a series of inclu-
sion criteria on this sample. First, I select individuals who worked at least an aver-
ageof 25hours per week. Then I collapse observations to individual, establishment,
and year levels. If data for a particular worker are given for the same establishment
multiple times, I select the observation with the highest wage. Next, I restrict the
focus to workers with at least a moderate degree of formal labor market attach-
ment, whose data are included in the sample for at least 5 of the 11 years, and I elim-
inate observations pertaining to individuals who have worked in more than three
firms per year. I also restrict the sample to firms with at least two workers in order
to compute coworkermeasures. These restrictions yield a final sample comprising
16,253,899 observations. Finally, I use the algorithm described by Abowd et al.
(2002) for computing the connected groups in the sample and select the largest
group. As discussed previously, applying the AKM methodology allows for iden-
tifying only worker and firm fixed effects within groups of connected workers.
The largest group contains 16,027,426 observations, or 98.6 percent of the sample.
Table A1 provides some statistics related to this sample.TABLE A1
Sample Statistics
Firms Workers
Whole Sample
Observations 25.9 million Number 579,000 Number 6.1 million
% college 36.2% Average
observations
44.59 Average
observations
4.18
% female 49% Average firm size 11.7 Average no. firms 1.36
Average age 35.5 Average no. years 3.81 Average no. years 4.01
Selected Sample
Observations 16.0 million Number 137,000 Number 2.0 million
% college 38% Average
observations
116.27 Average
observations
7.97
% female 49% Average no.
workers
22.65 Average no. firms 1.72
Average age 36.7 Average no. years 5.13 Average no. years 7.71T
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AllB. Derivation of the Value Functions and Surplus
Vacancies can meet three kinds of workers: unemployed, employed from reallo-
cation shocks, and unemployed from job-to-job transitions. The first two kinds of
workers have as their outside option unemployment, so the firm is able to extract
a share (1 2 b) of the surplus of the newly formed match. The latter kind has as
an outside option the total surplus generated on her current match, which leads
the firm to gain a share 12 b of the excess surplus over the previous match. This
implies the following value equation:
rV pð Þ 5 lFE 1 2 bð Þ
ðy
y
ðx
x
aE(x 0, y0, y)½S(x 0, y) 2 S(x 0, y0)e(x 0, y0)dx 0dy0
1 lF (1 2 b)
ðx
x
aU (x 0, y)S(x 0, y)u(x 0)dx 0
1 lFR 1 2 bð Þ
ðy
y
ðx
x
aU (x 0, y)S(x 0, y)e(x 0, y0)dx 0dy0:
(A1)
Next I compute the net present discounted value of a worker employed at wage
w(x, y, q):16
r 1 d 1 lR 1 lE
ðy
y
½S(x, y0) > S x, qð Þv(y0gdy0
 	
 W x, y, w x, y, qð Þð Þ 2 U xð Þ½  5 w x, y, qð Þ 2 rU xð Þ
1 lRb
ðy
y
½S(x, y0) > 0S(x, y0)v(y0)dy0
1 lE
ðy
y
½S(x, y0) > S x, yð Þ½b ⁢ maxfS(x, y0), S x, yð Þg
1 1 2 bð ÞminfS(x, y0), S x, yð Þgv(y0) 1 dy0:
(A2)
The firm analogous to this equation is given by
r 1 d 1 lR 1 lE
ðy
y
½S(x, y0) > S x, qð Þv(y0)dy0
 	
½ J x, y, w x, y, qð Þð Þ 2 V yð Þ
5 F x, yð Þ 2 w x, y, qð Þ 2 rV (y) 1 lE
ðy
y
½S(x, y0) > S x, qð Þ½(1 2 b)½S x, yð Þ
2minfS(x, y0), S x, yð Þgv(y0)dy0:
(A3)
If we add equations (A2) and (A3) and do some algebra, we obtain equation (3).
Note that this argument applies to matches that pay equilibrium wages. Follow-16 One can use a very similar equation to compute the value for the worker x of matching
with firm y at an arbitrary wage w,W(x, y, w). The only modification would be that job-to-job
transitions affect the worker value whenever the surplus of the newmatch exceeds the value
of the current contract for the worker: S(x, y0) > W (x, y, w) 2 U (x).
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ﬁrm wage differentials 000ing footnote 16, one can easily adapt these equations to compute values at arbi-
trary wages, which yields the same surplus function.C. Steady-State Flows
I now describe the equilibrium equations that jointly determine the stationary
distributions e(x, y), u(x), and v(y), the idleness rates u and v, and the necessary
restrictions on lF, lFE, and lFR. The first equilibrium equation described is be-
tween the flows in and out of employed matches of type (x, y). If S(x, y) ≤ 0, then
e(x, y) 5 0. Otherwise, e(x, y) is determined by equating the inflows to the out-
flows:
d 1 lR 1 lE
ðy
y
½S(x, y0) > S x, yð Þv(y0)dy0
 	
1 2 uð Þe x, yð Þ
5 ulU u xð Þv yð Þ 1 lR 1 2 uð Þv yð Þ
ðy
y
e(x, y0)dy0
1 lE 1 2 uð Þv yð Þ
ðy
y
½S x, yð Þ > S(x, y0)e(x, y0)dy0:
(A4)
On the left-hand side of the equation, matches of type (x, y) can be ended in
three ways: exogenous destruction shocks, reallocation shocks, and successful
job-to-job transitions. On the other hand, the inflows into those matches come
from workers hired from unemployment and employed workers of type x who
switch to jobs of type y via either reallocation shocks or job-to-job transitions.
In addition, I use two consistency conditions to determine the densities of un-
employed workers and vacancies, u(x) and v(y). The mass of employed workers
of type x has to equal the total mass of workers of that type minus the unem-
ployed ones:
1 2 u xð Þu 5 1 2 uð Þ
ðy
y
e(x, y0)dy0: (A5)
A similar condition needs to hold for jobs of type y:
J 2 v yð Þv 5 J 2 vð Þ
ðx
x
e(x 0, y)dx 0: (A6)
Next, the unemployment rate is determined by integrating (A4) over the full
support of x and y:
1 2 uð Þ d 1 lR
ðy
y
ðy
y
ðx
x
½S(x 0, y00) ≤ 0v(y00)e(x 0, y0)dx 0dy0dy00
 	
5 ulU
ðy
y
ðx
x
½S(x 0, y0) > 0u(x 0)v(y0)dx 0dy0:
(A7)
Another equilibrium requirement for equilibrium is that the total number of
employed workers has to equal the number of filled jobs:This content downloaded from 129.215.019.038 on January 24, 2018 01:11:36 AM
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Finally, the contact rates of workers and jobs must be such that the total number
of contacts is the same in equilibrium:
ulU 5 vlF ,
1 2 uð ÞlE 5 vlFE ,
1 2 uð ÞlR 5 vlFR :
(A9)
D. Computation Algorithm
One can use the following method to solve the model. First, select N grid points
on the supports of x and y in which we compute our endogenous objects.17 I be-
gin with initial guesses for e(x, y), S(x, y), and u on the selected node points. I
then adopt the following interactive procedure:
1. Given the old value of gO, SO, and uO, we can update these using equilibrium
equations (2)–(A9), thus obtaining gN, SN, and uN. When computing inte-
grals we use numerical integration using as node points the N grid points
previously selected.
2. We compute the distance between the old value and the update.We first com-
pute the maximum absolute value of (XN 2 XO)=(1 1 XO) on the grid for
eachof the three objects and then take themaximumvalue between the three.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 until the norm is sufficiently small.
Because we do not have results showing that these mappings are contractions, we
cannot anticipate that this algorithm works. Adding on-the-job search increases
the computational burden of the problem substantially, as it requires us to compute
double integrals. Because of that I use the solution to the problem without on-the-
job search as the initial condition for the model with on-the-job search. I setN to 30
when solving themodel with on-the-job search, which I found to be a good compro-
mise between speed and accuracy of the approximation. Also, because of discretiza-
tion, itmayhappen sometimes that the algorithmdoesnot converge becausematch-
ing decisions change discontinuously withminimal changes to the surplus. In order
to smooth that, assume that the decision rule takes a logistic form 1=(1 1 e2100S) in-
stead of indicator functions.18 Furthermore, I have found that “slowing” the up-
dates gO 5 agN 1 (1 2 a)gO improves the performance of the code.
E. Expanded Calibration
In Section V, I showed that the baseline calibration fails to match jointly all the
moments from the AKM regression. One possibility is that this was due to some
of the parameter restrictions that were imposed in the calibration. In order to ad-17 I select evenly spaced grid points (the midpoints of N evenly spaced intervals) instead
of Chebychev nodes because the endogenous matching sets imply that the regions of inte-
gration of the program are worker and firm specific.
18 This influences only very small surplus values, below 0.1 in modulus. Surplus values
can take the value of hundreds or thousands in typical calibrations.
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ﬁrm wage differentials 000dress that, I perform a second calibration, this time withmore flexibility andmany
more free parameters in order to see if the model can match the AKM moments
jointly with the moments that I had previously targeted for some configuration of
parameters.
I make the following modifications to the exercise. First, I allow the discount
rate, r, themeasure of jobs in the economy, J, and the weight of the CES function,
J, to vary as part of the calibration. I cap the discount rate at 20 percent a year
and J at 1.1, which would imply a vacancy rate around 14.5 percent and a monthly
vacancy-filling rate around 0.25 for the high school market.19 This rate is well be-
low the values documented in Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2010) using
JOLTS data (reducing J increases the job-filling rate). Second, I use beta distri-
butions instead of lognormal, which allows for very flexible shapes. This adds four
shape parameters (in addition to the two variance parameters) to the calibration,
leaving us with 16 parameters on the new formulation. Finally, I allow for negative
complementarities in production by allowing for h > 1.
I choose to match the same target moments as before, as well as the additional
moments from theAKM regression, Corr(v,w), Var(w)=Var(v 1 w), andR 2AKM and
the skewness of wages, to assure that the wage distribution has a reasonable shape.
Anothermodification is that I also consider a value of .2 for Corr(v, ~v), in line with
the lower values for that statistic presented in table 1. Finally, I drop
ð1
0
b(x 0)
E(wjx 0) u(x
0)dx 0
as one of the targetmoments from the calibration because there is a debate in the
related literature about the appropriate value for the flow value of leisure (see,TABLE A2
Expanded Calibration
Target
Corr(v, ~v) 5 :4 Corr(v, ~v) 5 :2
High School College High School College
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
UErate .412 .392 .373 .371 .412 .337 .373 .363
EUrate .019 .015 .008 .007 .019 .016 .008 .007
EErate .018 .022 .012 .015 .018 .023 .012 .015
Var(w) .220 .170 .303 .240 .220 .133 .303 .257
Corr(v, ~v) .400 .303 .400 .347 .200 .195 .200 .192
Var(DwFJJT) .096 .099 .090 .106 .096 .110 .090 .099
Pr(Dw < 0FJJT) .270 .347 .260 .290 .270 .368 .260 .285
E(DwFJJT) .039 .046 .047 .053 .039 .044 .047 .053
Skew(w) 2.028 2.028 2.487 2.492 2.028 2.027 2.487 2.491
Corr(v, w) 2.013 .171 2.013 .154 2.013 2.047 2.013 .097
Var(w)=Var(v 1 w) .217 .165 .217 .156 .217 .160 .217 .166
R 2AKM .889 .879 .889 .922 .889 .794 .889 .94419 The vacancy-filli
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Alle.g., Hall andMilgrom 2008). This leaves us with an overparameterized specifica-
tion with 12 target moments and 16 parameters.
Themain results are displayed in tables A2 andA3. As we can see, the expanded
calibration allows themodel tomatch theAKMmoments better, especially Var(w)=
Var(v 1 w). However, the model still falls short in some dimensions, such as a too
high value of Corr(v, w) relative to the data. I see this as consistent with the tension
to match Var(w)=Var(v 1 w) and Corr(v, w) jointly because of the nonmonoto-
nicities explained in Section III. Using the lower value for Corr(v, ~v) of .2, I obtain
the closest fit of the AKMmoments in the high school sample. However, that cal-
ibration falls short with respect to other moments (e.g., too little dispersion in
wages and a too low UErate) and features a discount rate of 17.5 percent a year.
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